




    Graduate School 
Master of Science in Accounting 
Master Degree Project No. 2011:47 












On the Value Relevance of Banks’ Valuation of Goodwill in Times 
























On the Value Relevance of Banks’ Valuation of Goodwill in Times 














Banks’ valuation of goodwill has been questioned by analysts and the media. Analysts 
suggest that bank management as of the inception of the financial crisis have exploited the 
unverifiable fair value goodwill accounting opportunistically. This suggestion implicitly 
implies that bank management was more likely than management of other industries to exploit 
goodwill accounting during the financial turmoil. In this thesis, I test whether the value 
relevance of banks’ valuation of goodwill was affected differently than other industries during 
the financial turmoil. To do so, I use the value relevance of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
valuation of goodwill as a control group for banks. Further, I hypothesize that (1) banks’ 
valuation of goodwill was value irrelevant since investors should have impounded the 
information of the analysts in the stock price; (2) pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of 
goodwill was value relevant since the financial turmoil did not severely affect its core 
business. The empirical result of the study suggests that the goodwill valuation of both banks 
and pharmaceuticals was value relevant. Moreover, the empirical result indicates that banks’ 
valuation of goodwill was not less value relevant than the pharmaceuticals’ valuation of 
goodwill. In summary, banks’ valuation of goodwill seems to have been value relevant during 
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1. Introduction  
This study investigates whether investors found American and European banks’ 
valuation of goodwill value irrelevant during the financial turmoil. Specifically, by testing the 
value relevance of banks’ valuation of goodwill; and applying the value relevance of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of goodwill as a control group during the financial 
turmoil: I test whether the value relevance of banks’ valuation of goodwill was impacted 
differently than other industries during the financial turmoil. In this study, Value relevance is 
defined as the statistical significance of the adjusted R-square and coefficients. 
As the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), in 2001, adopted fair value 
goodwill accounting; the value relevance of companies’ valuation of goodwill under the fair 
value regime has been debated. From the view of FASB, the adoption of fair value goodwill 
accounting was based on the implicit notions: (1) goodwill is a non-wasting asset; and (2) 
managements’ private information need to be disclosed more efficiently (Watts, 2003). 
Similar arguments were presented by the International Accounting Standard Boards (IASB) as 
they adopted the fair value goodwill accounting in 2004. IASB also emphasized that the 
convergence and adoption of fair value goodwill accounting regime would benefit investors 
as “[it] improves the relevance and reliability of financial information” (IASB, 2005b, p. 17). 
Thus, the intent of both FASB and IASB to implement fair value goodwill accounting was 
that management should provide investors with relevant understanding of goodwill over time 
(IASB 2005a; FASB 2001b), implying that management’s private information should be 
value relevant for investors. The implication with the new fair value regime under both U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), however, is that the valuation of goodwill is unverifiable, as no active 
market exists. This implication implies that management is provided with discretion that can 
be exploited opportunistically (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
According to Ramanna (2008) the impairment-only regime was not necessarily adopted 
in the interest of the investors. He finds that congressmen, receiving contribution from pro-
pooling companies, pressured FASB into omitting the initial proposal of substituting 
amortization-only regime goodwill accounting for the option to either use pooling or 
amortization regimes. Due to the pressure or not, FASB later proposed the unverifiable 
impairment-only goodwill accounting as the new substitute for pooling and amortization 
regimes. The fair value impairment-only proposition was supported by the congressmen, with 
contributions from pro-pooling companies, and cautiously accepted by other policy makers. 
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The result of Ramanna’s (2008) study suggests that the adoption of fair value goodwill 
accounting in the U.S. (and later in Europe) is partly due to the lobbying of American 
companies that predominantly exploited the pooling option. Further, prior studies indicate that 
management indeed exploits the discretion of the fair value regime opportunistically (e.g., 
Bens et al, 2007; Li & Sloan, 2010; Muller et al., 2009; Ramanna & Watts, 2010). Thus, 
instead of (as FASB and IASB intended) providing investors with private information on the 
economic value of goodwill, management seems to value goodwill in their own interest.  
Given that management is valuing goodwill opportunistically in conjunction with 
Ramanna’s (2008) findings, fair value goodwill accounting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
might not be value relevant for investors. Thus, the association between stock prices/returns 
and the valuation of goodwill under U.S. GAAP and IFRS should not be statistically 
significant (value irrelevant). Prior association studies on the adoption of SFAS 142 (now: 
ASC 350) suggest that information on goodwill under the fair value regime have had limited 
effect on the stock prices/returns (e.g., Li et al., 2005; Chen et al, 2004). In addition, Hamberg 
and Beisland (2011) find that the adoption of fair value goodwill accounting, in Sweden, 
under IFRS 3 even worsen the association between stock prices and information on goodwill 
compared to the prior prudent Swedish amortization regime. The result of these value 
relevance studies on fair value goodwill accounting, however, is based on pooled industries 
during periods prior to the eruption of the financial turmoil. Thus, the result of value 
irrelevance might not be generalizable to individual industries’ valuation of goodwill during 
the financial turmoil. For instance, Hamberg and Beisland (2009) find that the association 
between stock prices and general accounting information among non-traditional industries 
became more statistically significant during times of low growth expectations (bad times). 
What remains a puzzle is whether value relevance of goodwill differs between industries 
during macroeconomic shocks (bad times). This study attempts to provide insight to the 
puzzle by investigating whether the financial turmoil (bad times) impacted the value 
relevance of industries differently. The setting of the financial turmoil provides an opportunity 
to test whether the value relevance of individual industries’ valuation of goodwill was 
impacted differently. In both the U.S. and Europe, banks’ valuation of goodwill has been 
questioned, critics were (and still are) implicitly suggesting that banks, as of the inception of 
the financial turmoil, are relatively more likely to exploit the discretionary provided by fair 
value goodwill accounting. Further, it was suggested that the pharmaceutical industry was 
valuing goodwill accurately during the financial turmoil (e.g., Gros, 2009; Hayn, 2010; Healy, 
2009). Based on these suggestions in conjunction with theory on how information is 
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impounded in the stock price, I hypothesize that banks’ valuation of goodwill was value 
irrelevant during the financial turmoil; whereas the pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of 
goodwill was value relevant during the financial turmoil. The purpose of using the 
pharmaceutical industry as a control group for banks is that, unlike the banking industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry’s core business should not have been severely affected as a direct 
result of the financial turmoil. This argument is based on the notion that the demand of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s products is inelastic. Thus, two industries that are affected 
differently by the financial turmoil should also value goodwill differently. Results consistent 
with the hypotheses suggest that companies’ valuation of goodwill is value relevant for 
investors if the management of the industry is expect to posses incentives that align with the 
interest of the investors. Further, consistent result would also implicitly suggest that 
management incentives are important for investors in both the U.S. and Europe. Hence, 
throughout the study, I assume that management is responsible for corporate decisions and if 
shareholders’ interests do not perfectly align with the incentives of management, corporate 
decisions will reflect management interest.  
This study provides FASB and IASB with information on whether banks’ valuation of 
goodwill under the unverifiable fair value regime is value relevant for investors during the 
financial turmoil. In addition, the study indicates whether the value relevance differs between 
industries as investors’ and management’s interests are likely to differ between industries 
during the financial turmoil. Thus, this study implicitly tests whether the value relevance of 
the valuation of goodwill is consistent between industries and regions (America and Europe) 
during the financial turmoil.  
Both applied association tests (price/return models) indicate that the goodwill valuation 
of banks and pharmaceuticals were to some extent value relevant to investors. In contrast to 
the hypotheses of this study, the return regression model indicates that the goodwill valuation 
of European banks and American pharmaceutical and banks were to some extent significant 
and negatively associated with stock return. More interesting is that banks’ valuation of 
goodwill seem to have been more value relevant than pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill 
under the return model. The result of the return model: that banks’ valuation of goodwill was 
more value relevant than pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil, 
is confirmed in the American setting by the price regression model. However, in the European 
setting, pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill seem to have been more value relevant than 
banks’ valuation of goodwill. Further, the price regression model suggests that goodwill items 
were value relevant for investors. For European banks information on capitalized goodwill 
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was positively associated with stock prices; whereas European pharmaceuticals’ capitalized 
goodwill and goodwill impairments seem to have been statistically significant and negatively 
associated with stock prices. However, due to multicollinearity problems, the result of the 
European pharmaceutical’s capitalized goodwill is not reliable for further interpretations. For 
the American setting, goodwill seems to have been value relevant as well. American banks’ 
capitalized goodwill was associated with stock prices. Further, American pharmaceuticals’ 
capitalized goodwill and goodwill impairments were associated with the stock prices, which 
indicate that the valuation of goodwill is value relevant information for investors. The 
conclusion of the price and return regression models was that banks and pharmaceuticals 
valuation of goodwill seem to have been value relevant for investors.  
By linking the results of each value relevance regression above suggest that there were 
no difference in value relevance between pharmaceutical and banks during the financial 
turmoil. By pooling all observations of each industry and interact the independent goodwill 
variables with a dummy for banks, differences in value relevance between banks and 
pharmaceuticals is tested. The direct test indicates that no interaction variables are significant 
which implies that the there was no differences between the response coefficients of banks 
and pharmaceuticals during the financial turmoil. Hence, banks’ valuation of goodwill was 
not less value relevant than the pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of goodwill during the 
financial turmoil.    
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the accounting 
standards and prior systematic studies on fair value goodwill accounting. Further, the 
criticism of banks’ valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil is discussed. Section 3 
develops two hypotheses: the first to test whether American and European banks’ valuation of 
goodwill is value relevant; the second to test (regardless of the outcome of the first 
hypothesis) whether the pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of goodwill is value relevant 
during the financial turmoil. In section 3, implications and alternate explanations to the 
hypotheses are addressed. Section 4 describes the research design and presents the empirical 
analysis. Section 5 summarizes the findings of the study and explores avenues for future 
research. 
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2. Discussion on Fair Value Goodwill Accounting 
In this section, I discuss the background to fair value goodwill accounting under U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS, respectively. Further, I discuss the recent criticism of American and 
European bank managements’ valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil. The section 
concludes with a discussion on prior research on management’s valuation of goodwill under 
the fair value regime. 
2.1 Background to Fair Value Goodwill Accounting 
As of 2001, FASB adopted fair value goodwill accounting and, thus, abolished historical 
value goodwill accounting. However, the adoption of fair value goodwill accounting for bank 
acquisitions were delayed till 2002, as Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
72 was rescinded by SFAS 147. The decision to adopt fair value goodwill accounting was 
based on the implicit notions that: (1) goodwill is a non-wasting asset; (2) managements’ 
private information need to be disclosed more efficiently (Watts, 2003). Thus, the adoption of 
the unverifiable fair value estimates of goodwill is based on FASB’s implicit assumption that 
investors will benefit from management’s favorable private information on future cash flows 
(Ramanna & Watts, 2010). In 2002, based on the Norwalk Agreement, FASB and IASB 
initiated a joint project to converge U.S. GAAP and IFRS. As part of the convergence 
process: fair value goodwill accounting was adopted by IASB in 2004, but required for 
European companies as of 2005. The argument of IASB to converge goodwill accounting 
under IFRS with U.S. GAAP was to “[improve the] comparability of the financial information 
around the world” (IASB, 2005b, p. 16). In practice, the new fair value approach to goodwill 
accounting under both U.S. GAAP and IFRS applies the purchase method with at least yearly 
tests for impairments. The change of method to fair value goodwill accounting yield that 
companies no longer are allowed to neither use pooling-of-interest nor purchase method with 
the concept of amortization and necessary write downs. 
In the U.S., goodwill accounting is based on FASB’s Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 805 Business Combinations and ASC 350 Goodwill and Other Intangible 
Assets. ASC 805 stipulates that the purchase method should be applied when valuing acquired 
assets, thus, the difference between the purchase price and the fair value of acquired assets is 
the capitalized goodwill. ASC 350 focuses on accounting and reporting of goodwill after it is 
capitalized in accordance with ASC 805. Further, ASC 350 stipulates that goodwill 
impairment test should be conducted at least annually at the reporting unit level. When testing 
for goodwill impairments under ASC 350, two steps need to be considered. The first step is to 
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compare the fair value of the reporting unit with its carrying amount, including goodwill. If 
the fair value to carrying amount-ratio is equal to or larger than one no impairment is needed; 
however, if this ratio is smaller than one impairments might be needed. Depending on the 
outcome of step one: step two is only considered if the fair value to carrying amount-ratio 
implies the need of impairments. Thus, step two focuses specifically on the valuation of 
goodwill, and if the fair value of goodwill is less than its book value; the difference is the 
reported goodwill impairment. 
In Europe, Goodwill accounting is based on IASB’s International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) 3 Business Combinations and International Accounting Standards (IAS) 36 
Impairment of Assets. IFRS 3 defines the recognition criteria for which acquired assets should 
be capitalized and more importantly what should be capitalized as goodwill. Under IFRS 3 the 
purchase method is applied: thus the difference between the purchase price and the fair valued 
assets is the capitalized goodwill.   Further, IFRS 3 stipulates that capitalized goodwill shall 
be tested for impairment in accordance with IAS 36. Since acquired goodwill shall be 
allocated to CGUs of the acquiring company: goodwill is tested for impairment at this level. 
Goodwill under IAS 36 is defined as the future economic benefits reflected by the 
combination of the acquired assets and, hence, goodwill is not individually identifiable or 
separately recognized. Thus, before the goodwill is tested for impairments, all other assets of 
the cash-generating unit (CGU) must be tested for impairments. Further, impairment tests 
shall at least be conducted yearly: companies choose the date themselves, which will be the 
date for all coming years. If the book value of goodwill exceeds its recoverable amount; the 
difference is reported as goodwill impairment. Recoverable amount is defined as the highest 
amount of the fair value in use or the fair value adjusted for cost of sales.  
Although IASB adopted fair value goodwill accounting as part of the convergence 
process between U.S. GAAP and IFRS: there are still some differences. For instance, the 
amendments of IAS 36 (in 2009) did not fully converge with U.S. GAAP and, thus, there are 
still significant differences in the impairment test process. One of the main differences relates 
to, for instance, at what level of the company the goodwill should be tested. Under U.S. 
GAAP, goodwill is tested at the reporting unit level; under IFRS, goodwill is tested at the 
CGU level. Reporting unit is defined as a unit not lower than the operating segment; whereas 
CGU is not defined with a lower limit: not larger than a segment. Thus, goodwill impairments 
under U.S. GAAP and IFRS can theoretically be tested at different levels. In addition to the 
testing of goodwill at different levels, the impairment test of goodwill is not fully converged 
either. For instance, under U.S. GAAP it is possible to deduct liabilities from the carrying 
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amount of the reporting unit before comparing it with the fair value. Under IFRS, however, it 
is not allowed to deduct liabilities from the carrying value. These implications of the not fully 
converged fair value goodwill accounting between U.S. GAAP and IFRS could potentially 
yield differences in valuation of goodwill for the same economic event.  
2.2 Background to the Discussion on Banks’ Valuation of Goodwill 
As the investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 
2008, the American and European interbank markets collapsed and banks in the regions 
suffered severely. However, the financial crisis not just revealed macroeconomic issues: real 
weaknesses of banks’ balance sheet were also revealed. In many cases, capitalized assets on 
banks’ balance sheet were overvalued. Especially, so called contagious asset related to the 
sub-prime or its associated assets, i.e. CDOs, CDS, made it difficult for banks to sustain and, 
thus, banks collapsed or were on the brink of collapsing (Sorkin, New York Times, 2008). As 
the situation became unsustainable and proved to have negative effects on the real economy, a 
recession unfolded as a result of the financial turmoil, the American and European 
governments realized that intervention was indeed needed (Christie, Bloomberg, 2008; 
Reuters, 2008a; Economist, 2009). This intervention was based on the belief, such as, that 
banks need to recover quickly in order for the economy to recover from the recession 
(Reuters, 2009). Thus, most American and European banks’ losses and diminishing equity 
were covered with liquidity from the governments and the quantitative ease of the central 
banks. 
As the balance sheet of American and European banks is recapitalized, a new topic of 
concern has emerged: critics propose that banks’ value goodwill inaccurately. Healy (New 
York Times, 2009), for instance, claims that the next source of losses for the banking industry 
can potentially be related to accumulated goodwill impairments. The argument is that due to 
the bust of the banking industry: the size of the goodwill does no longer reflect the economic 
reality. According to Gros (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009) the issue of inflated 
capitalized goodwill could yield another expensive bailout of the banking industry. 
In Europe, banks are blamed for excessively delaying goodwill impairments. For 
instance, Hayn (Financial management, 2010) argues that European companies and especially 
European banks need to impair its goodwill. Further, Gros (Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2009) suggest that the European bank management’s unwillingness to impair 
goodwill sufficiently is shared with the European policy makers. The argument is that 
politicians in Europe as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis need to stabilize the 
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European financial markets and, thus, not addressing the issue. Healy (New York Times, 2009) 
goes even further and argues that European policy makers’ fear of an even more severe 
financial turmoil makes them uninterested in large goodwill impairments among banks.  
Healy’s notion is supported by Rogoff (interview on SVT, 2010); he claims that the European 
policy makers are trying to sweep all the problems of the European banking industry under 
the rug. To prove his point, Rogoff exemplifies the European Central Bank’s (ECB) stress test 
of the European banking industry. For instance, all Irish banks passed the stress test, however, 
some months later most of them were on the brink of bankruptcy, implying that the ECB is 
disguising actual problems of the European banking industry (Rogoff, interview on SVT, 
2010).  
In Sweden, for example, analysts have criticized Swedbank’s valuation of goodwill, a 
bank heavily exposed to the Baltic banking market. Although the Baltic region’s financial 
markets collapsed, Swedbank has not impaired the goodwill associated with the Baltic 
banking market. For example, Malmqvist (Dagens Industri, 2010) argues that Swedbank 
clearly should impair its goodwill since it is not possible to “defend” the goodwill with the 
superior earning power criterion. He concludes that Swedbank’s “rogue accounting” does not 
only deceive the financial analysts and investors, but also is damaging to the reputation of the 
Swedish capital market. Swedbank, on the other hand, argues that no evidence indicate that 
the goodwill of roughly 12.4 billion SEK associated with the Baltic bank market need to be 
impaired (E24, 2009).  
While European banks are blamed for excessively delaying goodwill impairments 
during the financial turmoil, American banks are blamed for excessively accelerating 
impairments of goodwill. In 2008, compared to all American industries, the banking industry 
was by far the heaviest affected industry in terms of goodwill impairments (in actual dollars). 
In late 2008, Federal officials launched measures that would ease the pressure on banks’ 
goodwill impairments requirements in order for banks to stop the eroding effect on the 
balance sheet (Labaton, New York Times, 2008). In the period of 2008-2009, the goodwill 
impairments among American banks decreased with more than 90 percent (Palatnik, KPMG, 
2010). However, as the other industries have precipitously returned to normal pre-crisis 
impairment amounts, banks are still impairing considerably higher than normal pre-crisis 
amounts (Duff and Phelps, 2010). Although American banks’ total amount of goodwill 
impairments dropped in 2009, as of 2010, some of the largest banks in the U.S. once again 
reported goodwill impairments in billions of dollars. Especially as Bank of America impaired 
its goodwill associated with a credit card subsidiary, analysts criticized bank management to 
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be too pessimistic when valuing goodwill (Son, Bloomberg, 2011; Clarke & Aspan, Reuters, 
2011, Ahmed & Cordeiro, Reuters, 2011): implying “big bath” impairments of goodwill. 
Healy (New York Times, 2009) suggests that American banks’ aggressive impairments are due 
to managers’ interest to manage earnings in order to more easily cut jobs, slash budgets and 
reduce capital investments. Also, it is argued that banks are excessively accelerating goodwill 
impairments in order to improve the potential for future inflated earnings (Healy, New York 
Times, 2009).  
Based on the criticism of American and European banks’ valuation of goodwill, two 
implied conclusions can be derived: (1) Banks in Europe are excessively delaying 
impairments of goodwill; whereas American banks are excessively accelerating impairments 
of goodwill. (2) American and European banks seem to be more extreme than the average 
industry of its region, respectively. Implying that European banks are more cautious to 
impairments of goodwill than the other industries in Europe; and American banks are 
impairing goodwill more aggressively than the other American industries.  
The implied difference between American and European banks’ valuation of goodwill 
can be related to, as discussed in the sub-section above, differences between goodwill 
accounting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Although the regional differences in goodwill 
accounting can be explained by differences in applied accounting standards, differences 
between industries in the same region cannot be explained by the applied accounting standard. 
Thus, the implied differences in the valuation of goodwill can potentially be related to other 
factors than accounting regulation. According to Holthausen and Watts (2001) the fair value 
regime of goodwill accounting provides management with significant discretion as no active 
markets for goodwill exists. Thus, accounting for goodwill under both U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
provides discretion that management can exploited opportunistically. The unverifiable 
characteristic of goodwill accounting implies that management’s incentive to the valuation of 
goodwill is an important factor to consider in addition to the applied accounting standard. 
This conclusion implies that the possible differences between American and European banks’ 
valuation of goodwill can be related to differences in management’s incentives rather than the 
applied accounting standard.  
2.3 Prior Research on Managements’ Valuation of Goodwill 
Prior studies suggest that management value goodwill under the unverifiable fair value 
accounting regime opportunistically. However, the notion is not unchallenged: Jarva (2009) 
find that American companies’ goodwill impairments during 2002-2005 are based on 
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economic factors, and not earnings management. Although Jarva’s study find evidence that 
management do not exploit goodwill in order to manage earnings, the  model is, however, 
unable to explain whether firms not impairing goodwill during the period are 
opportunistically trying to avoid impairments. 
In contrast to Jarva’s (2009) findings, Hayn and Hughes (2006) find that management 
tends to value goodwill opportunistically by excessively delaying impairments of goodwill. 
Thus, they imply that goodwill impairment is based on other incentives than the underlying 
economics of the goodwill. Further, Bens et al. (2007) find that since the adoption of SFAS 
142 market have not reacted to goodwill impairments. Based on Hayn and Hughes result in 
conjunction with the finding of Bens et al. (2007); impairments of goodwill seem to be 
delayed until investors understand the economic value of goodwill. This conclusion is 
supported by Ramanna and Watts (2010): they find that management does not impair 
goodwill until the investors discounted a lower value of goodwill. In addition, the high 
frequency of non-impaired goodwill could not be explained by favorable private information 
among the management, rather it is suggested that management’s deliberate delay of goodwill 
impairments depends on CEO tenure. Ramanna and Watts’ (2010) result is supported by the 
findings of Li and Sloan (2010) that SFAS 142 (now: ASC 350) is exploited by management 
as a tool of delaying impairments of goodwill, as it lag the deteriorating operational 
performance, to temporarily inflate earnings. Furthermore, they find that impairments are only 
taken when pre-impairment operating margins are unusually low. The results of the above 
discussed studies imply that management is not able or willing to forecast the value of 
goodwill and, hence, are waiting until there is substantial historical evidence that the goodwill 
need to be impaired (Li & Sloan, 2010). 
The notion that management is opportunistically delaying goodwill impairments is 
confirmed by Muller’s et al. (2009) study. However, their result challenges Li and Sloan’s 
(2010) conclusion that management is unable to predict goodwill impairments. The study uses 
goodwill impairments as a proxy for whether management is trading on private information. 
Although management risks facing litigation, management of companies impairing goodwill 
seems to be more likely to strategically sell their stockholdings 24 month prior to the 
announcement of goodwill impairments than management of companies, not impairing 
goodwill. This result implies that management is able to predict the correct value of goodwill 
in advance. Although the result of Muller’s et al. (2009) study is based on companies with 
limited (below median) analyst following, it provides evidence that when possible: 
management deliberately exploits the discretion provided by fair value goodwill accounting.  
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In conclusion, prior studies indicate that management is opportunistically delaying 
goodwill. Jarva (2009) find, however, that American companies’ impairments of goodwill 
during 2002-2005 are based on the underlying economics of the goodwill, and not earnings 
management. I argue, however, that since Jarva’s (2009) result is based on times prior to the 
financial crisis, it is not generalizable to bank management’s valuation of goodwill during the 
financial turmoil. Thus, it is assumed that bank management is, depending on their interest, 
willing to either excessively delay impairments or excessively accelerate impairments of 
goodwill during the financial turmoil.   
The above discussed results are based on an American setting. However, based on prior 
studies on general accounting information in a European setting, I argue that the above results 
can also be generalized to a European setting. I base this argument on: (1) goodwill 
accounting under both IFRS and U.S. GAAP provide management discretion; and (2) 
according to Ball et al, (2000), Leuz et al (2003) and Lang et al. (2006): European companies 
are more likely than American companies to exploit impairments to smooth earnings, 
implying that management of European companies also use the discretion provide by fair 
value goodwill accounting. Thus, I expect, based on the theory, that management in both 
Europe and America is able, and is willing, to manage goodwill in their own interest. 
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3. Hypotheses Development 
In this section, I motivate and hypothesize whether investors are likely to find banks’ 
valuation of goodwill value relevant during the financial turmoil. I conclude with a discussion 
on implications and alternate explanations to the developed hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Research Motivation and Development of Hypotheses 
The intent of both FASB and IASB to implement fair value goodwill accounting was 
that management should provide investors with relevant understanding of goodwill over time 
(IASB 2005a; FASB 2001a), implying that management’s private information should be 
value relevant for investors. IASB also emphasized that the convergence and adoption of fair 
value goodwill accounting will benefit investors as “[it] improves the relevance and reliability 
of financial information” (IASB, 2005b, p. 17).  
According to Ramanna (2008), however, FASB’s adoption of the impairment-only 
regime is not necessarily in the interest of the investors. He finds that congressmen, receiving 
contribution from pro-pooling companies, pressured FASB into drop the initial proposal of 
substituting amortization-only regime goodwill accounting for the option to either use pooling 
or amortization regimes. Due to the pressure or not, FASB later proposed the unverifiable 
impairment-only goodwill accounting as the new substitute for pooling and amortization 
regimes. The fair value impairment-only proposition was supported by the congressmen, with 
contributions from pro-pooling companies, and cautiously accepted by other policy makers. 
The result of Ramanna’s (2008) study suggests that the lobbying of American companies who 
predominantly exploited the pooling option are responsible for the adoption of the 
impairment-only regime in the U.S. (and later in Europe). 
As discussed in section two, the adopted fair value impairment-only regime of goodwill 
accounting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS provides management with significant discretion to 
the valuation of goodwill (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001). In addition, prior studies 
indicate that management indeed exploits the discretion opportunistically (e.g., Bens et al, 
2007; Li & Sloan, 2010; Muller et al., 2009; Ramanna & Watts, 2010). Thus, instead of (as 
FASB and IASB intended) providing investors with private information on the economic 
value of goodwill, management seems to value goodwill in their own interest. 
Given that management is valuing goodwill opportunistically in conjunction with 
Ramanna’s (2008) result, fair value goodwill accounting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS might 
not be value relevant for investors. Thus, the association between stock prices and the 
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valuation of goodwill under U.S. GAAP and IFRS should not be econometrically significant. 
Prior association studies on the adoption of SFAS 142 (now: ASC 350) suggest that goodwill 
information under the fair value regime have had limited effect on the stock price (e.g., Li et 
al., 2004; Chen et al, 2004). In addition, Hamberg and Beisland (2011) find that the adoption 
of fair value goodwill accounting under IFRS 3 in Sweden not only is insignificant but even 
worsen the association between stock prices and information on goodwill compared to the 
prior prudent Swedish amortization regime. However, the result of these value relevance 
studies on goodwill accounting is based on industries in aggregate and periods prior to the 
eruption of the financial turmoil. Thus, the result of value irrelevance might not be applicable 
to the value relevance of individual industries’ valuation of goodwill during the financial 
turmoil. For instance, Hamberg and Beisland (2009) find that the association between stock 
prices and general accounting information among non-traditional industries becomes more 
significant during times of low growth expectations (bad times). Non-traditional industry is 
defined as an industry more likely to capitalize investments as intangible assets. 
The setting of the recent financial turmoil provides an opportunity to test whether the 
value relevance of individual non-traditional industries’ valuation of goodwill is impacted 
differently. What makes the financial turmoil interesting (and macroeconomic shocks in 
general) is that it affects industries’ core business differently. Thus different industries might 
have different incentives to the valuation of goodwill. Given this argument, industries with 
core business not affected by the financial turmoil should be more value relevant than 
industries severely affected.   
As discussed in section two, the financial turmoil has put particularly the banking 
industry’s core business under pressure. According to analysts and media reports, American 
and European banks have valued goodwill opportunistically. The notion is that American and 
European banks’ valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil does not reflect the 
economic value: as European banks are excessively delaying goodwill impairments; whereas 
American banks are excessively accelerating the impairments of goodwill due to the financial 
turmoil. (e.g., Gros, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009; Hayn, Financial management, 
2010; Healy, New York Times, 2009; Duff and Phelps, 2010). The notion that bank 
management is exploiting the fair value accounting regime during the financial turmoil is 
supported by Fiechter & Meyer’s (2011) study. The study indicate that American bank 
management in 2008, as the crisis was most severe, indeed used the discretion provided by 
U.S. GAAP to smooth the earnings. Although the result is based on the discretion provided of 
the change from mark-to-market to mark-to-model valuation (Level 3 fair value) under ASC 
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825 Financial Instrument, the result aligns with the assumption of this study: bank 
management are using the discretion to manage earnings in their own interest. 
Elaborating on Hamberg and Beisland’s (2009) result, banks’ valuation of goodwill 
should be value relevant during the financial turmoil (bad times). However, in contrast to this 
notion, I argue that due to the high analysts and media coverage of the banking industry, as a 
result of the financial turmoil: banks’ valuation of goodwill should be value irrelevant. As a 
result of banks attracting high analyst coverage: the efficiency in the price discovery of bank 
stocks is improved among investors (e.g., Brennan, Jagadeesh & Swaminathan 1993; Brennan 
& Subrahmanyam, 1995; Kimbrough, 2007). Thus, the debate on banks’ inaccurately valued 
goodwill is publicly acknowledged and, hence, should be impounded in the stock prices of 
banks in the short and long term (Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000).  
Thus, even if bank management value goodwill accurately or not, the finding of prior 
studies that management in general value goodwill opportunistically in conjunction with the 
analysts and media reports: investors should be hesitative towards the banking industry’s 
valuation of goodwill and therefore not finding the valuation value relevant. Based on these 
reasons, I hypothesize that neither American nor European banks’ valuation of goodwill is a 
value relevant financial reporting element during the financial turmoil: 
[H1a] American Banks’ valuation of goodwill is not value relevant during the 
financial turmoil 
[H1b] European Banks’ valuation of goodwill is not value relevant during the 
financial turmoil 
 
The purpose of H1a and H1b is to test whether investors, with the stock market price as 
a proxy, find banks’ valuation of goodwill value relevant in times of financial turmoil. 
Empirical results consistent with H1a and H1b suggest that investors acknowledge the 
criticism of analysts and media reports on banks valuation of goodwill and, thus, do not 
impound banks’ information on goodwill into the stock price. However, since prior studies 
claim that fair value goodwill accounting in general is not value relevant (e.g., Hamberg and 
Beisland, 2011; Li et al., 2005; Chen et al, 2004), I cannot conclude that results consistent 
with H1a and H1b specifically relate to banks; and not to all industries during the financial 
turmoil. 
In order to test whether the financial turmoil is affecting the value relevance of bank’s 
valuation of goodwill differently than other industries, I include the value relevance of 
another non-traditional industry’s valuation of goodwill as a control: the pharmaceutical 
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industry. What makes the pharmaceutical industry interesting as a control is that, unlike the 
banking industry, its core business is not as severely affected by the financial turmoil since 
consumers are price-inelastic to the pharmaceutical’s products and services (Penner, 2004). 
Thus, pharmaceutical’s valuation of goodwill should not be directly affected by the financial 
crisis (or other macroeconomic shocks). Instead, the valuation of goodwill should be 
associated with the opportunities associated with the research and development of acquired 
companies. This argument is also implicitly confirmed by the stock markets: the market beta 
of the pharmaceutical industry is generally low which implies that investors find the industry 
less dependent on the business cycle (e.g., Golec & Vernon, 2007; Myers & Howe, 1997).  
An additional argument for including the pharmaceutical industry as a control is that, in 
contrast to the banking industry, analysts claim that pharmaceutical’s valuation of goodwill is 
accurate and consistent during the financial turmoil (e.g., Hayn, Financial management, 2010; 
Duff and Phelps, 2010). Applying the same reasoning as in the development of hypothesis 
one (e.g., Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000), the analyst coverage and information on the 
pharmaceutical industry’s accurately valued goodwill should be publicly acknowledged. 
Hence, the pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill should be value relevant information as it 
is perfectly impounded in the stock price in the short and long term.  
Thus, I conclude that the pharmaceutical industry is an appropriate control group for 
whether results consistent with H1a and H1b is related to whether companies are adversely 
affected by the financial crisis or whether investors in general do not find goodwill value 
relevant during the financial turmoil. Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize that 
pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill is value relevant:  
[H2a] American pharmaceutical Industry’s valuation of goodwill is value relevant 
during the financial turmoil 
[H2b] European pharmaceutical Industry’s valuation of goodwill is value relevant 
during the financial turmoil 
 
3.2 Implications and Alternate Explanations 
Hypothesis 1 tests whether banks’ valuation of goodwill under the fair value regime of 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS is value irrelevant during the financial turmoil. To do this, H1a and 
H1b test the value relevance of American and European banks’ valuation of goodwill, 
respectively. Linking H1a and H1b together is the assumption that banks’ valuation of 
goodwill under the fair value regime of U.S. GAAP and IFRS is value irrelevant during the 
financial turmoil. Empirical evidence consistent with hypothesis 1 indicates that banks’ 
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valuation of goodwill under both U.S. GAAP and IFRS is value irrelevant during the financial 
turmoil. Evidence consistent with hypothesis 1 is interesting since it would contradict the 
findings of Hamberg and Beisland (2009) that the value relevance of accounting information 
becomes more significant during bad times. Also, it is interesting for FASB and IFRS since 
the argument for adopting fair value goodwill accounting was to improve the relevance for 
investors over time (including the financial turmoil). 
Hypothesis 2 tests whether the pharmaceutical’s valuation of goodwill under the fair 
value regime of U.S. GAAP and IFRS is value relevant during the financial turmoil. To do 
this, H2a and H2b test the value relevance of American and European pharmaceuticals’ 
valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil, respectively. Hypothesis 2 is the 
assumption that the pharmaceutical industry is valuing its goodwill accurately and consistent 
and, thus, is value relevant for investors. Evidence consistent with H2a and H2b suggest that 
fair value goodwill accounting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS is value relevant (for at least one 
industry) during the financial turmoil. 
Linking hypotheses 1 and 2 is the assumption that during the financial turmoil 
(macroeconomic shock), companies have different incentives to value goodwill and investors 
are aware of it. During the financial turmoil, based on analysts and media reports, banks are 
expected to value goodwill opportunistically; whereas pharmaceuticals are expected to value 
goodwill accurately. If investors impound the information of the analysts to the stock price 
instead of the information of bank and pharmaceutical management: banks’ valuation of 
goodwill should be value irrelevant; whereas pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill should 
be value relevant. Thus, empirical results consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that the 
financial turmoil affects the value relevance of different industries, where the most severely 
affected industry (banks’ valuation of goodwill) is not value relevant; whereas one of the least 
severely affected industries (pharmaceutical) is value relevant. Thus, Results consistent with 
the hypotheses suggest that companies’ valuation of goodwill is value relevant for investors if 
the management of the individual industry is expect to posses incentives that align with the 
investors. 
Empirical results inconsistent (in different combinations) with hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
H2a and H2b indicate either that the financial turmoil do not impact banks and other 
industries differently; or that additional factors than solely the financial turmoil affects the 
value relevance (e.g., differences in trust to management, culture, goodwill is not impounded 
in the stock price regardless of the business cycle and industry). For instance, (1) if empirical 
results are consistent with hypothesis 1 (i.e. H1a-H1b) but not hypothesis 2 (i.e., H2a-H2b) 
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indicates that investors are not impounding goodwill in the stock price, implying that the 
adoption of fair value goodwill accounting was unnecessary since investors are not including 
the information. An alternative interpretation relates to how exposed the pharmaceutical 
industry is to the financial products. Although it is unlikely, the internal banks of the 
pharmaceutical industry, for instance, can be just as exposed to the financial turmoil as the 
listed banks (2) If empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 2 but not with hypothesis 1 
indicates that during the financial turmoil investors find both banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ 
valuation of goodwill value relevant. This result would imply that fair value goodwill 
accounting has been successfully adopted since investor finds the information on goodwill 
relevant: as FASB and IASB intended. (3) Other combinations of empirical results consistent 
and inconsistent with H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b implies that there are regional differences 
between the value relevance of American and European banks and pharmaceuticals, 
suggesting that the efficiency of information diffusion differ in the regions or that the 
convergence of fair value goodwill accounting between U.S. GAAP and IFRS is not 
sufficiently implemented and, hence, affects the value relevance differently. Thus, by linking 
hypotheses 1 and 2 together, provides implicit indication on whether investors only mistrust 
banks’ valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil or whether investors mistrust the 
valuation of goodwill in general. It is possible that the banking and pharmaceutical industry in 
one region value goodwill accurately; whereas banks and pharmaceuticals in another region 
value goodwill opportunistically.  
Potential implications of interpreting the hypotheses relate to possibility that investors 
based on implicit information from management anticipated how the financial turmoil would 
affect banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill and, hence, the valuation of 
goodwill is value relevant information for investors as it is presented and not when it is 
published in the financial statements. However, this study focus on how accounting 
information is valued during the setting of the financial turmoil, and not whether investors are 
able to anticipate on beforehand, although it might affect the results. In addition, it is possible 
that investors in one region do not impound the analyst reports and, hence, find goodwill 
value relevant even tough it is not associated with its economic value, or vice versa. My 
association tests cannot rule out these possibilities, but this is not necessary to interpret the 
empirical evidence of hypotheses 1 and 2, since investors’ choice not to impound information 
of analysts to the stock price is related to value relevance as well. 
Another implication relates to the cultural heterogeneity of Europe. In this study it is 
implicitly assumed that Europe and America are two homogenous areas, respectively. 
 18 
Although America is not homogenous (e.g., state laws and regulation), the problem with 
heterogeneity is likely to be more severe in Europe. For instance, based on the code of law, 
Europe can be divided into three regions and, in addition, the level of investor protection and 
view on financial markets differ within Europe (La Porta et al., 1998). Specifically the UK 
might affect the result of Europe, since its capital market, investor protection and rule of law 
is similar to America (La Porta et al., 1998). In addition, prior to the adoption of fair value 
goodwill accounting, Europe have in the past been more prudent than America to the 
valuation of goodwill. For instance, van der Zanden and Nobes (2002) find that before the 
adoption of fair value goodwill accounting, European companies on average amortized 
goodwill under a shorter (5-20 years) period than American companies (40 years). However, 
since IFRS is applied in a heterogeneous setting: the problems with heterogeneity must be 
accepted.  
The value relevance of goodwill valuation during bad times (e.g., financial turmoil) is 
not necessarily generalizable. For instance, Hamberg and Beisland (2009) conclude, that over 
time: value relevance of accounting information varies. They find that the value relevance 
models in bad times (relative to good times) better explains returns with accounting data. 
Since this study is only based on the setting of the financial turmoil, this finding implies that 
the result of value relevance can only be generalized to times of financial turmoil (or 
macroeconomic shocks). 
Concluding, the datasets include companies in different sizes meaning that analyst 
following might not be impounded as efficiently as anticipated in the hypothesis. However, 
investors should be more cautious towards banks in general since the financial turmoil has 
attracted attention to specifically this industry’s dilemma. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I start with describing the sample selection procedure and address 
potential caveats with the data. Further, the research design of the empirical models is 
presented. The section concludes with a presentation of the main findings and a discussion on 
the reliability and validity of the empirical results. 
 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
In this study, I employ data from banks and pharmaceuticals listed on the American and 
European stock exchanges in the period of the financial turmoil, all collected from 
Datastream. I define the financial turmoil (2007-2009) as the period starting as of the bust of 
the American housing market and the following financial crisis. In order to maintain sufficient 
inference of the value relevance, all included stock market prices are based on efficient 
developed stock markets (Aboody et al., 2002). Thus, I use prior studies on market efficiency 
to select appropriate stock markets. Based on Worthington and Higgs’ (2011) results, I 
include market data from the U.S., EU 15, Norway and Switzerland. However, the stock 
markets of Luxembourg and Greece are excluded due to stock market inefficiency (Dicle and 
Levendis, 2011). It should be noted that after all necessary adjustments in the dataset of the 
study (explained below), only two Greek banks and pharmaceutical firms, respectively, and 
one bank in Luxembourg were excluded: implying that the exclusions most likely do not drive 
the results of the study. Hence, Europe is defined as the countries of EU 15 (excluding Greece 
and Luxembourg), Norway and Switzerland. In the vein of the efficient stock market 
argument, all banks and pharmaceuticals listed for “over the counter” (OTC) trading are 
excluded from the analysis, as well. The reason for not including the eastern European 
markets (besides from the developed market criterion) is based on Chan’s et al. (1997) result 
that eastern European, except from the Hungarian, stock markets are inefficient. 
In this study, based on the Oxford Dictionary of English, bank is defined as an 
organization that acts as a financial intermediary and, thus, income is primarily related to 
interest and fees on money, financial services and products. In Datastream, two categories 
fulfill this definition: Financial Services sector and Bank sector. However, since this study 
focus on banks: the financial institutions and financial services (including investment banks) 
are not included. The pharmaceutical industry is defined as an industry that is developing, 
producing and marketing licensed drug for medication purposes. In Datastream, this industry 
is found under the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector-category. 
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The included banks and pharmaceuticals of the initial datasets comply with different 
accounting standards and have different fiscal year-ending. Thus, necessary adjustments of 
the data are taken to improve the comparability of the data. Since the focus of this study is on 
the valuation of goodwill under U.S. GAAP and IFRS: banks and pharmaceuticals with no 
capitalized goodwill under either accounting standard during the period of financial turmoil 
are excluded. Hence, firms with no group accounting are excluded since goodwill only exists 
in consolidated financial statements. Since companies listed on the American stock exchanges 
are allowed to comply with IFRS and some of the listed companies in Europe are complying 
with local standards and even US GAAP: I exclude all companies in the U.S. datasets that are 
not confirmed to comply with U.S. GAAP; further, I excluded companies in the European 
datasets that was not confirmed to comply with IFRS. The data on complied accounting 
standard was collected from Datastream. In order to avoid duplications: the sample was 
filtered for non-equity securities, secondary quotes and non-major securities. Further, for any 
bank or pharmaceutical listed in more than one stock exchange: stock prices and accounting 
information of the major stock exchange in the country where the company is based is applied 
to the study. 
In order to avoid comparability problems due to information disclosed at different dates, 
banks and pharmaceuticals with fiscal year-end other than December 31 in year t are 
excluded. Further, in order to avoid survivor bias, the initial dataset included all banks and 
pharmaceuticals of Datastream. That is, companies registered as dead, suspended delisted 
were initially included with active companies, and if active during any given year of the   
period they are included in the analysis. Based on prior market based studies, the stock price 
is a lead variable from April 1 in year t+1. The lead variable stock price (P
ret
) is based on the 
assumption that investors impound accounting information from the annual report in April 
rather than the year-end financial statements. In addition, all accounting items and stock 
market prices applied in the study were converted by Datasteam into U.S. dollars. 
In the data from Datastream, missing values are quite common and especially for 
information on goodwill impairments. In order to improve the model more data is need. Thus, 
I investigated manually whether the missing values equal “zero” impairments by checking 
banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ financial statements randomly. I find that missing values are 
related to no impairments. This adjustment might result in biased regression results as for 
some companies the missing value is not equal to zero. It should be noted that I only include 
“zeros” in the cells that Datastream specifically states: no values available. All empty cells are 
not adjusted with the assumption of the value of zero.       
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Table 1 presents the number of included firms on April 1 in year t+1. The table is split 
into the sample of U.S. firms accounting for goodwill under U.S. GAAP and European firms 
accounting for goodwill under IFRS. The number of listed banks in both U.S. and Europe has 
decreased slightly over time. Similar pattern goes for the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S. 
and Europe. In the dataset, American banks and pharmaceuticals have fewer registered 
impairments than its European ditto, which might seem to contradict the discussion in section 
two: U.S. banks are excessively impairing goodwill. However, this is just the number of 
impairment charges and not the total amount of impairments. The mean value of goodwill 
impairment among American banks is slightly higher than the European banks (see table 9). 
Further, the portion of capitalized goodwill among American banks is deceasing faster than 
European banks. For the pharmaceutical industry, it is on the contrary, the portion of 
capitalized goodwill is increasing in both the American the European setting. The latter 
pattern in the European setting seems to correlate with number of delisted pharmaceuticals in 
Europe is increasing. Moreover, goodwill impairments seem to be more stable but slightly 
decreasing in the European setting; whereas U.S. Pharmaceuticals are a more volatile during 
the financial turmoil.  
Table 1 
Sample Description 
                America (U.S. GAAP)                Europe (IFRS)  























































































































































4.2 Research Design for the Hypotheses  
Econometrically, there are two main approaches to investigate investors’ reaction to 
accounting information: short window or long-window. Short window approach attempts to 
explain the relation between accounting information and the short term movements of the 
market value by including additional information to the disclosed year-end information (e.g., 
analyst reports, earnings alerts) as explanatory variables. Long-window approach, however, 
attempts to explain long-term differences and, thus, excluding information that has short term 
effects on investors’ valuation of equity. In this study, I apply the long-window approach 
since the relevance of managements’ valuation of one specific accounting element (goodwill) 
is of interest (and not the short term fluctuation of the stock price).  
The value relevance of accounting information is determined by using association tests, 
with the stock market price as a proxy for investor perception. Thus, value relevance research 
attempts to explain the relevance (statistical significance) of accounting information by 
comparing the relation between managements’ and the markets’ valuation of accounting 
elements. The association test is usually based on either price or return models (e.g., Easton & 
Harris, 1991; Collins et al., 1999). The relevant elements of the price model relates to both the 
balance sheet and the income statement; whereas the value relevant elements of the return 
model relates exclusively to the income statement. However, since the price model is deflated 
with the number of shares outstanding whereas the return model is deflated by the ingoing 
value of equity: it is suggested that price models suffer from scaling problems (e.g., Kothari & 
Zimmerman, 1995; Easton & Sommers, 2003; Gu, 2007). According to Kothari and 
Zimmerman (1995) it is the research question that determines which one of the models to 
apply. A common way in accounting research to avoid problems with reliability, however, is 
to employ both models (e.g., Hamberg & Beisland, 2011). For instance, Hamberg and 
Beisland (2011) find that goodwill impairments of the return model are not value relevant 
whereas goodwill (in the balance sheet) of the price model is value relevant. Thus, in order to 
include all value relevant effects of both the balance sheet and the income statement and, thus, 
improve the reliability: I apply both the return and the price model to test whether banks’ 
valuation of goodwill as well as pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill is value relevant or 
not during the financial turmoil. Value relevance is defined as the statistical significance of 





4.2.1 Return Model Specification  
The original return model in market based accounting research states that the return 
(RET) is equal to the function of earnings (Earn) and the change of earnings (ΔEarn) (e.g., 
Easton & Harris, 1991; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999): 
 
RET = f (Earn, ΔEarn)    (1)  
 
In order to test whether banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill is value 
relevant goodwill impairments need to be included in Equation (1). In order to do so, I apply 
Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) extraction of goodwill reductions from reported earnings with 
the exception that instead of defining goodwill reductions as amortization and impairments of 
goodwill: I only include goodwill impairments (GWimp), since during the financial turmoil 
only impairments are allowed under both U.S. GAAP and IFRS. This extraction yield 
equation 2:  
 
Earn = (Earn – GWimp) + GWimp    (2) 
 
By inserting equation (2) into equation (1) yields a return model that includes Earnings 
adjusted for goodwill impairments:  
 
RET = f [(Earn – GWimp), GWimp, Δ(Earn – GWimp), ΔGWimp] (3) 
 
I use equation (3) to examine whether banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ valuation of 
goodwill is value relevant during the financial turmoil. A poor predictor of future 
performance is losses (Hayn, 1995; Ball & Shivakumar, 2006), a common element in times of 
financial turmoil. Thus, I adjust for the problem of negative earnings (as suggested by Francis 
et al, 2003) by interacting a dichotomous variable (D) for negative earnings (Earn), which 
takes the value of one if earnings is negative, otherwise zero. I deflate all exogenous variables 
(as suggested by Easton & Sommers, 2003) with the market value of equity of April 1 in year 
t. This yields the following regression model:  
 
RETit = β0(Earn + GWimp)it + β1GWimpit + β2Δ(Earn + GWimp)it + β3 ΔGWimpit 
+ β4 (D*Earnit)+ εit   
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Where RETit is the change of the dividend-adjusted stock price (P
ret
) from April 1 in 
year t to April 1 in year t+1 for firm i. Earnit is the net profit for firm i in year t. GWimpit is 
the value of goodwill impairment (if any) for firm i in year t. Dit is a dichotomous variable 
that takes the value of 1 if net profit for firm i is negative in year t. Δ is the change of the 
variable form year t-1 to year t.  
 
4.2.2 Price Model Specification 
The second model I use to test the value relevance of banks’ and pharmaceuticals’ 
valuation of goodwill is the price model specification. The advantage with the price model, as 
mentioned above, is that it includes items from both the balance sheet and income statement. 
The original price model states that the market value of equity (Price) is equal to the function 
of the book value of the equity (BVE) and net profit (Earn).  
 
Price = f(BVE, Earn)     (4) 
 
In order to test the value relevance of managements’ valuation of goodwill, it need to be 
included in equation (4), Following Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) extraction of goodwill in 
the price model: the goodwill on the balance sheet is decomposed from the book value of 
equity (BVE): yielding (BVE – GW). Goodwill impairments (GWimp) are extracted from 
earnings (Earn): yielding (Earn – GWimp). These extractions yield the following price model: 
 
Price = f[(BVE - GW), GW, (Earn - GWimp), GWimp]  (5) 
 
I use equation (5) to test whether banks and pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill is 
value relevant. As in the return model, I adjust for negative earnings and as suggested by 
Collins et al. (1999): I use the dichotomous variable to interact for losses (D) with BVE and 
Earn, respectively. The empirical model yields: 
 
 
Priceit = β0 + β1 (BVE + GW)it + β2 GWit + β3 (Earn + GWimp)it + β4 GWimpit + β5 
(D*BVE)it + β6 (D*Earn)it + εit 
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Where Price is the market value of equity for firm i in the end of year t and BVEit is the 
book value of equity for firm i in year t. GWit is the book value of goodwill for firm i in year t. 
Earnit is the net earnings for firm i in year t. GWimpit is the impairment of goodwill (if any) 
for firm i in year t. The endogenous and all exogenous variables are deflated with the number 
of shares outstanding for firm i in year t. 
 
4.3 Empirical Results for the Hypotheses 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator was applied to the return and the price 
regression models, respectively. Since the exogenous variables of the datasets seem to include 
large variances: I test the datasets for potential heteroskedasticity. The White’s test indicates 
that some of the datasets suffers from heteroskedasticity. In order maintain good inference of 
the statistical analysis, the data is adjusted with the Huber/White’s HAC estimator (as 
suggested by: Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Adjustments for outliers with the studentized 
residual were also applied to each model; all values that exceed three standard deviations are 
excluded from the regression. No more than 1 percent of observations were dropped as a 
result of the exclusion. Additional univariate statistics of the applied return and price 
regression models are presented in Appendix 1-4. Further, in this sub-section, for the comfort 
of the reader, Pr denotes the accounting elements related to the price regression (i.e., 
GWimp
Pr





4.3.1 Main Findings 
Overall, the determinant coefficients of the regression models of this study seem to align with 
Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) models. However, there are some differences as well. The 
main difference is that some of the regression models in this study unlike Hamberg and 
Beisland’s (2011) regression models suffer from multicollinearity. I have unsuccessfully tried 
to rectify the problem with multicollinearity of the models. One of the approaches was to use 
the mean value of the variable that has the highest correlation with the other variables, and 
interact a variable that takes the value of the difference between the mean and the individual 
observation of the variable. The approach resulted in Stata omitting other variables in the 
given regression model. Since this study applies Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) model, 
model modifications are not considered. Thus, I decided not go further with compensating for 
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multicollinearity if it meant omitting variables in the model
2. As Hamberg and Beisland’s 
(2011) study did not suffer from multicollinearity, even though intuitively the response 
variables and its change variables should correlate, implies that during turbulent times 
problems with correlations appears more evident in the price and return regression models. 
Also, another potential explanation to why this study suffers from multicollinearity can be 
related to, unlike Hamberg and Beisland (2011), the focus on individual industries rather than 
pooled industries. This is a likely explanation given that when banks and pharmaceutical of 
this study were pooled together: the variance inflation factor no longer indicates 
multicollinearity problems.  
Table 2 and 3 presents the value relevance of goodwill accounting items using the return 
regression model specification. American and European banks’ impairment of goodwill 
GWimp
Ret
 is negatively associated with stock return. However, only goodwill impairments of 
European banks are statistically significant (t-stat: -1.95). For the European and American 
pharmaceuticals goodwill impairments have contradictory association with stock return. 
Goodwill impairments of European pharmaceuticals is negatively associated with stock return 
(t-stat: -0.18); whereas American pharmaceuticals’ goodwill impairments are positively 
associated with stock return (t-stat: 0.84). Neither of the American and European 
pharmaceuticals’ goodwill impairments is statistically significant. Further, all four return 
regressions indicate that change of goodwill impairments ΔGWimpRet is negatively associated 
with stock return.  
Table 2 
Return Regression – Europe   
 
    Variables            European Pharma. (IFRS)                 European Banks (IFRS) 
 Coefficient t-stat VIF  Coefficient t-stat VIF 
        
        
Constant -0.15897** -2.50   -0.351*** -2.84  
Earn-GWimp  1.7721 1.46 66.79  1.007** 2.39 2.85 
GWimp -1.2564 -0.18 22.98  -1.492* -1.95 1.58 
Δ Earn-
GWimp 
-0.7062 -0.84 14.35  -2.187** -2.38 4.29 
Δ GWimp -1.1782 -0.17 20.43  -1.962** -2.43 6.72 
D*Earn -1.0894 -0.99 77.20  1.087 1.32 3.62 
        
Obs. 87    72   
Adj. R-square 0.0607    0.2535   
Mean VIF 17.08    2.91   
        
*** =1% Significance; ** =5% Significance; * =10% Significance, (two-tailed)  
                                                 
2 Since multicollinearity does not affect the models reliability, just the individual variables with high noise (Studenmund, 
2006), only relevant variables associated with the valuation of goodwill is an issue in this study. 
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In contrast to the developed hypotheses, European banks’ valuation of goodwill seems 
to have been value relevant for investors. The goodwill items GWimp
Ret
 and ΔGWimpRet of the 
European banks is, unlike for the European pharmaceutical, statistically significant. Further, 
the adjusted R-square of European banks is larger than the European pharmaceutical industry 
(25.35% compared to 6.07%). In addition, the results of the European pharmaceutical return 




Also American banks’ valuation of goodwill indicates some value relevance (although 
less significant than the European banks) as the change goodwill impairment ΔGWimpRet is 
statistically significant (t-stat: -2.86). For the pharmaceutical industry, the valuation of 
goodwill is not as strongly associated with the stock return as hypothesized. Although the 
change in goodwill impairments of the American pharmaceutical is statistically significant (t-
stat: -1.86), American banks’ change of goodwill is more value relevant (t-stat: -2.86). Also, 
compared to American banks, the adjusted R-square of the American pharmaceuticals is 
lower. Thus, the results of the return regression suggest that banks’ valuation of goodwill was 
more value relevant than pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill for investors during the 
financial turmoil.  
Table 3 
Return Regression – America  
 
   Variables        American Pharma. (U.S. GAAP)          American Banks (U.S. GAAP) 
 Coefficient t-stat VIF  Coefficient t-stat VIF 
        
        
Constant -0.0582 -0.56   -0.1814** -2.51  
Earn-GWimp  1.153 0.88 35.12  0.709** 2.02 3.38 
GWimp 4.792 0.84 2.47  -0.800 -1.61 3.76 
Δ Earn-
GWimp 
0.4134*** 5.10 2.01  -0.634* -1.75 4.49 
Δ GWimp -8.66* -1.86 2.16  -1.034** -2.86 4.45 
D*Earn -1.356 1.05 35.46  -2.974*** -4.49 2.11 
        
Obs. 47    158   
Adj. R-square 0.2477    0.1802   
Mean VIF 15.44    3.36   
        
*** =1% Significance; ** =5% Significance; * =10% Significance, (two-tailed)  
 
 
                                                 
3
 As suggested by Hamberg and Beisland (2011), I apply the rule of thumb of VIF-coefficients equal to 10 and larger 
indicates multicollinearity.  
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Table 4 and 5 presents the value relevance of banks and pharmaceuticals, measured 
using price regression model specifications. In the European setting, the capitalized goodwill 
GW
Pr
 is negatively associated with stock prices. The goodwill balance of European banks and 
pharmaceuticals is statistically significant (t-stat: -8.39 and -3.36, respectively). Further, 
goodwill impairment is also negatively associated with stock prices. European banks’ 
goodwill impairments is not statistically significant (t-stat: -0.53); whereas European 
pharmaceuticals’ goodwill impairments is value relevant (t-stat: -3.15). However, the 
goodwill impairment variable of the European pharmaceutical suffers from problems with 
multicollinearity, which might affect the result of this variable. Hence, the result must be 
interpreted cautiously. 
Table 4 
 Price Regression – Europe  
 
   Variables         European Pharmaceutical (IFRS)                        European Banks (IFRS) 
 Coefficient t-stat VIF  Coefficient t-stat VIF 
        
        
Constant 15.036    49.533*** 4.79  
BEV- GW  1.6742*** 4.74 13.07  -0.410** -2.23 25.44 
GW -3.097*** -3.36 13.26  -6.289*** -8.39 3.25 
Earn-GWimp 1.768 0.73 1.28  5.114*** 7.5 26.6 
GWimp -24.531*** -3.15 1.20  -5.127 -0.53 1.01 
D*Earn -0.9616 -0.22 2.94  (omitted) -  
D*BVE -3.3278* -1.90 1.11  -4.3188 -0.65 1.02 
        
Obs. 108    84   
Adj. R-square 0.8585    0.7263   
Mean VIF 5.98    9.40   
        
*** =1% Significance; ** =5% Significance; * =10% Significance, (two-tailed) 
 
   Table 5 
 Price Regression – America  
 
   Variables    American Pharmaceutical (U.S. GAAP)       American Banks (U.S. GAAP) 
 Coefficient t-stat VIF  Coefficient t-stat VIF 
        
        
Constant 2.520 1.14   1.1813 0.21  
BEV- GW  2.0151*** 4.37 1.62  0.4035** 1.98 14.47 
GW 0.7312*** 4.33 1.72  -0.222 -0.16 1.06 
Earn-GWimp 4.338 1.22 6.49  4.2101*** 2.95 14.71 
GWimp -8.491** -2.20 .83  -14.35** -2.34 1.02 
D*Earn -2.2312 -0.49 5.88  1.1813*** -3.00 1.02 
D*BVE -4.1612 1.60 1.08  (omitted) -  
        
Obs. 55    189   
Adj. R-square 0.6666    0.8851   
Mean VIF 3.10    6.46   
        
*** =1% Significance; ** =5% Significance; * =10% Significance, (two-tailed) 
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In the American setting, capitalized goodwill has no unified association with stock 
prices. Balanced goodwill of American banks’ goodwill is negatively associated with stock 
prices; whereas balanced goodwill of American pharmaceuticals is positively associated with 
stock prices. Form the investors point of view, capitalized goodwill of American banks is 
value irrelevant (t-stat: -0.16); whereas capitalized goodwill of American pharmaceuticals is 
value relevant (t-stat: 4.33).  
In both the American and European setting, goodwill impairment GWimp
Pr
 is negatively 
associated with stock prices. Goodwill impairment of American banks and pharmaceuticals 
and European pharmaceutical is statistically significant, but European banks’ goodwill 
impairments are value irrelevant for investors. Adjusted R-square for all for price regressions 
is large. However, adjusted R-square for American banks is larger than American 
pharmaceutical (88.52% and 66.66%, respectively); whereas the adjusted R-square of the 
European pharmaceuticals is larger than the European banks (85.85% and 72.63%, 
respectively). The results of the prices regression suggest that investors found both banks and 
pharmaceuticals valuation of goodwill value relevant. For the American and European 
pharmaceuticals, both capitalized goodwill and impairments of goodwill was value relevant 
information for investors. Multicollinearity problems in the European pharmaceutical data 
imply that the value relevance of capitalized goodwill should be interpreted cautiously. 
European banks’ capitalized goodwill was value relevant; whereas American banks’ 
impairments of goodwill were value relevant information for the investors.   
 
4.3.2 Differences in Response Coefficients  
  Although the analysis above indicates that the goodwill valuation of both banks and 
pharmaceuticals is to some extent value relevant, it does not answer the question of whether 
or not the value relevance of banks valuation of goodwill is significantly different from the 
pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill. To test for significant differences between the value 
relevance of banks and pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill, I use the differences in the 
response variables of goodwill to tests whether investors respond differently to banks and 
pharmaceuticals’ valuation of goodwill. Thus, I pool the observations from both the American 
and the European setting and interact the independent goodwill variables with a dummy for 
banks. The results of table 6 is based on pooled ordinary least square regression when 
examine the difference between goodwill valuation of banks and pharmaceuticals. The Price 
and return regression model specifications are applied to the data. 
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In the return regression, goodwill impairments response coefficient GWimp for 
pharmaceuticals is -5.297 (t-stat: -3.06). The difference in goodwill impairment response 
coefficient between pharmaceuticals and banks GWimp*Bank is 4.3419 (t-stat: 2.47). This 
difference indicates that investors are more positive to banks’ goodwill impairments, but still 
negative with a response coefficient of -0.9551. However, the result is not reliable since the 
VIF of 180 and 182, respectively, indicate sever multicollinearity. The Change goodwill 
impairments response coefficient ΔGWimp is insignificant for both pharmaceuticals and 
banks. In the price regression, the goodwill response coefficient of pharmaceuticals is 0.6376 
(t-stat: 2.18). The difference in goodwill response coefficient between pharmaceuticals and 
banks is -1.5026 and insignificant (t-stat: -1.25). Further, both goodwill impairments and the 
interaction variables of goodwill impairments are insignificant in the price regression, which 
suggest that there is no difference between the value relevance of banks and pharmaceuticals’ 
valuation of goodwill. 
Table 6  
Differences in response coefficients 
 
                                     Return Regression Model                               Price Regression Model 
Variables    Variables    
 Coefficient t-stat VIF  Coefficient t-stat VIF 
        
Constant -0.1881*** -3.70  Constant 10.115*** 2.94  
Earn-GWimp 0.9046*** 3.05 3.02 BEV- GW 0.3469** 2.16 13.35 
GWimp -5.297*** -3.06 180 GW 0.6376** 2.18 1.57 
Δ Earn-GWimp -0.2791 -0.96 4.74 Earn-GWimp 4.3411*** 3.50 2.73 
Δ GWimp -0.0824 -0.25 5.64 GWimp -12.596*** -4.53 1.02 
D*Earn -1.3567** -2.38 2.54 D*Earn -2.9965 -1.51 2.73 
    D*BE -1.7422 -1.17 2.68 
        
GWimp*Bank 4.3419** 2.47 182 GW*Bank -1.5026 -1.25 1.36 
Δ GWimp*Bank -0.0486 -0.34 2.86 GWimp*Bank 0.8543 -0.18 2.65 
        
Obs. 274   Obs. 357   
Adj. R-square 0.2449   Adj. R-square 0.8498   
Mean VIF 54.5   Mean VIF 4.87   
        
*** =1% Significance; ** =5% Significance; * =10% Significance, (two-tailed) 
 
Since the interaction variables not suffering from multicollinearity problems are 
statistically insignificant in the return and the price model, it suggests that there was no 
difference in value relevance between the goodwill valuation of pharmaceuticals and banks 
during the financial turmoil. This conclusion is further strengthen as the adjusted R-square for 
both the return and the price model with interactions is similar to adjusted R-square of 




5.1 Summary of Findings 
As FASB introduced fair value goodwill accounting, the value relevance of companies’ 
valuation of goodwill has been debated. From the standard-setters’ point of view, the new fair 
value regime is beneficial for the investors. Both FASB and IASB claim that investors will 
benefit from management’s valuation of goodwill under the fair value regime rather than 
static historical value regime (FASB, 2001; IASB, 2005a).  
Prior research, however, suggests that management is exploiting the fair value regime 
opportunistically and, thus, implying that investor should not find the valuation of goodwill 
value relevant (e.g., Li and Sloan, 2010). Studies on the value relevance of goodwill also find 
that goodwill under the fair value accounting regime is value irrelevant (e.g., Hamberg and 
Beisland, 2011). However, the result of these studies includes pooled industries and not 
individual industries. Further, these results seem to vanish in bad times; Hamberg and 
Beisland find that non-tradition industries’ valuation of goodwill becomes more relevant as 
the growth expectations are low. Thus, the setting of the financial turmoil provide an 
opportunity to test whether the value relevance is impacted differently as industries’ core 
business is most likely to be impacted differently by the financial turmoil. Specifically, the 
value relevance of banks’ valuation of goodwill is compared with the value relevance of the 
pharmaceuticals valuation of goodwill during the financial turmoil.   
The return regression model in this study indicates that the valuation of goodwill of 
European banks and American pharmaceutical and banks were to some extent associated with 
stock return and, thus, value relevant for investors. What is interesting is that banks’ valuation 
of goodwill seem to have been more value relevant than pharmaceuticals’ valuation of 
goodwill. Also, the price regression model suggests that goodwill items of both banks and 
pharmaceuticals were value relevant for investors. For European banks information on 
capitalized goodwill was associated with stock prices; whereas European pharmaceuticals’ 
capitalized goodwill as well as goodwill impairments seems to have been associated with 
stock prices. However, due to multicollinearity problems, the result of capitalized goodwill of 
the European pharmaceutical is not reliable for further interpretations. For the American 
setting, goodwill seems to have been value relevant as well. American banks’ capitalized 
goodwill was associated with stock prices. Further, American pharmaceuticals’ capitalized 
goodwill and goodwill impairments were associated with the stock prices, which indicate 
value relevant information for investors. The conclusion of the association regression tests is 
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that banks and pharmaceuticals valuation of goodwill seem to have included value relevant 
information to investors. The European pharmaceutical data suffers from multicollinearity 
which makes it difficult to draw any reliable inference from the results of the return regression 
analysis. However, the price model regression indicates that goodwill impairments of the 
European pharmaceuticals were value relevant information for the investors.    
The results of the value relevance models suggest that there were no differences in the 
value relevance between the valuation of goodwill of pharmaceuticals and banks in both 
regions (America and Europe). By pooling all observations and interact the independent 
goodwill variables with dummy variables for banks, differences in value relevance between 
banks and pharmaceuticals is tested. The direct test indicates that interaction variables not 
affected by multicollinearity problems are statistically insignificant which implies that the 
there is no differences between the response coefficients of banks and pharmaceuticals. Thus, 
the conclusion of this study is that banks’ valuation of goodwill was not less value relevant 
for investors than the pharmaceutical industry’s valuation of goodwill during the financial 
turmoil. In addition, goodwill seems to have been value relevant information for investors 
during the financial turmoil.             
The result of this study is interesting since it indicates that the adoption of fair value 
goodwill accounting is relevant for investors, at least during the financial turmoil, which to 
some extent aligns with the findings of Hamberg and Beisland (2009). This result, however, is 
in conflict with the result of Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) association test: who found that 
the valuation of goodwill to be value irrelevant information under the fair value regime. The 
explanation for the conflicting results could potentially be related to the differences in settings 
between this study and Hamberg and Beisland’s (2011) study. The financial turmoil might 
have an effect on how investors include information on the valuation of goodwill than during 
times with macroeconomic stability. Further, Hamber and Beisland’s (2011) study is based on 
the Swedish setting which might differ from the European and American setting of this study.     
 
5.2 Avenues for Future Research 
Notwithstanding the result of this study, the quality of the applied dataset for both the 
European and American setting is low and, thus, more research on how the financial turmoil 
affects the value relevance of banks and other industries is needed. Events during the financial 
turmoil are problematic to study since variables tend to be affected more randomly and 
swiftly as the investors and markets per definition acts economically irrational. However, the 
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perception of investors during turbulent times is interesting for standard setters since it is most 
likely then the accounting regulation and investor protection is needed the most.  
In this study, it is assumed that analysts and media reports have analyzed companies 
correctly and that this explicitly means that European and American banks are exploiting the 
discretion provided by fair value goodwill accounting opportunistically. However, the 
macroeconomic events during the financial turmoil have different implications even for 
companies in the same region or industry. Thus, a study on whether American and European 
banks (or other industries) actually value goodwill differently is of interest and linking these 
results to the hypotheses of this study. The result of liking these two studies would also test 
the efficiency of information diffusion and whether value relevance of fair value goodwill 
accounting affected by analysts or other external factors than managements’ information. 
    A last suggestion for further research is to analyze whether Hamberg and Beisland’s 
(2011) price/return regression models are robust (especially when industries are not pooled) 
during turbulent times. In this study, the models suffer more or less from severe 
multicollinearity, this problem need to be canvassed in order to find out if the model 
specification needs to be improved or if the problem is related to the applied data in this 
study.   
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Appendix 1 Correlation Matrices: Return Model 
 
   Table 7 
   Pairwise Correlations (Pearson) – Return Model 
 
Return Model       
       
America, Banks       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return (1)       
Earn-GWimp (2) -0.0299      
GWimp (3) -0.0800 0.6507     
Δ Earn-GWimp (4) -0.1308 0.6164 0.5728    
Δ GWimp (5) -0.1657 0.3782 0.7013 0.7521   
D*Earn (6) 0.2930 0.4921 0.0095 0.4309 0.0037  
       
Europe, Banks       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return (1)       
Earn-GWimp (2) 0.5870      
GWimp (3) -0.0517 0.1156     
Δ Earn-GWimp (4) -0.1006 0.4221 0.1942    
Δ GWimp (5) -0.1620 0.0331 0.3155 0.7539   
D*Earn (6) -0.0169 0.2221 0.0160 0.3689 -0.0093  
       
America, Pharmaceutical       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return (1)       
Earn-GWimp (2) 0.0869      
GWimp (3) -0.1819 0.0899     
Δ Earn-GWimp (4) 0.1674 0.7000 0.0385    
Δ GWimp (5) -0.4630 0.1189 0.7079 0.1208   
D*Earn (6) 0.0620 0.9821 0.0174 0.7059 0.0973  
       
Europe, Pharmaceutical       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return (1)       
Earn-GWimp (2) 0.2036      
GWimp (3) -0.2225 -0.1981     
Δ Earn-GWimp (4) 0.1200 0.9481 -0.0566    
Δ GWimp (5) -0.2117 -0.1894 0.9735 -0.0687   
D*Earn (6) 0.2007 0.9878 -0.2919 0.9346 -0.2829  
       
 
Where RETit is the change of the dividend-adjusted stock price (P
ret) from April 1 in year t to April 1 in year t+1 for firm i.  
Earnit is the net profit for firm i in year t. GWimpit is the value of goodwill impairment (if any) for firm i in year t. Dit is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if net profit for firm i is negative in year t. Δ is the change of the variable form 
year t-1 to year t.  
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Appendix 2 Correlation Matrices: Price Model 
 
Table 8 
Pairwise Correlations (Pearson) – Price Model  
 
Price Model        
        
America (Banks)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price (1)        
BEV-GW (2) 0.9296       
GW (3) 0.1274 0.1260      
Earn-GWimp (4) 0.9325 0.9631 0.1712     
GWimp (5) -0.0635 -0.0134 0.1009 0.0134    
D*Earn (6) 0.0262 0.0306 0.0271 0.0691 -0.0154   
D*BVE (7) - - - - - - - 
        
Europe (Banks)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price (1)        
BEV-GW (2) 0.4638       
GW (3) 0.0251 0.8070      
Earn-GWimp (4) 0.5103 0.9786 0.8133     
GWimp (5) -0.066 -0.0705 -0.0059 -0.0439    
D*Earn (6) 0.0577 0.0521 0.0447 0.0838 0.0127   
D*BVE (7) - - - - .- - .- 
        
America (Pharma)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price (1)        
BEV-GW (2) 0.6054       
GW (3) 0.3446 -0.2841      
Earn-GWimp (4) 0.3636 0.5529 -0.2340     
GWimp (5) -0.1477 0.0365 -0.0761 0.3876    
D*Earn (6) 0.1986 0.4950 -0.4790 0.08091 0.0538   
D*BVE (7) 0.0994 0.1169 0.0401 0.0378 0.0378 0.033  
        
Europe (Pharma)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price (1)        
BEV-GW (2) 0.8192       
GW (3) 0.7230 0.9530      
Earn-GWimp (4) 0.1288 -0.0520 -0.1649     
GWimp (5) 0.0010 0.0489 -0.0317 0.2885    
D*Earn (6) -0.4295 -0.6604 -0.6086 0.7195 -0.0132   
D*BVE (7) 0.0809 0.0702 0.0264 0.1820 -0.1525 0.2140  
        
 
Where Price is market value of equity for firm i in the end of year t and BVEit is the book value of equity for firm i in year t. 
GWit is the book value of goodwill for firm i in year t. Earnit is the net earnings for firm i in year t. GWimpit is the impairment 
of goodwill (if any) for firm i in year t.  
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Appendix 3 Descriptive Statistics: Return Model 
 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics; Return Model 
   
American Banks      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Return 274 -0.0188 0.6570 -0.9571 3.3503 
Earn-GWimp 209 0.2081 0.3435 -1.522 3.1345 
GWimp 209 0.0197 0.1770 0 2.5435 
Δ Earn-GWimp 205 0.0192 0.3624 -2.377 2.7925 
Δ GWimp 205 0.0038 0.2497 -2.4687 2.5435 
D*Earn  357 -0.0286 0.2374 -3.5333 0 
      
European Banks      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Return 201 0.0649 0.677 0.898 3.631 
Earn-GWimp 181 0.244 0.705 -0.933 6.311 
GWimp 181 0.0192 0.098 0 0.990 
Δ Earn-GWimp 94 -0.070 0.430 -3.507 1.884 
Δ GWimp 94 -0.020 0.280 -2.894 0.990 
D*Earn  222 -0.021 0.102 -0.934 0 
      
American Pharma      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Return 287 0.2387 1.4522 -0.9463 16.125 
Earn-GWimp 56 -0.1367 0.5956 -3.5381 0.3394 
GWimp 56 0.01391 0.035 0 0.1662 
Δ Earn-GWimp 55 -0.0710 0.6780 -3.435 2.414 
Δ GWimp 55 -0.0004 0.0558 -0.1662 0.1662 
D*Earn  314 -0.2222 0.7480 -9.444 0 
      
European Pharma      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Return 226 -0.0712 0.5755 -1 4.25 
Earn-GWimp 109 -0.0880 0.4320 -3.366 0.5197 
GWimp 109 0.0092 0.0423 0 0.3617 
Δ Earn-GWimp 105 -0.0485 0.3491 -2.652 0.5823 
Δ GWimp 105 0.0022 0.0435 -0.170 0.3442 
D*Earn  285 -1554 0.4748 -4.437 0 
      
 
Where RETit is the change of the dividend-adjusted stock price (P
ret) from April 1 in year t to April 1 in year t+1 for firm i.  
Earnit is the net profit for firm i in year t. GWimpit is the value of goodwill impairment (if any) for firm i in year t. Dit is a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if net profit for firm i is negative in year t. Δ is the change of the variable form 
year t-1 to year t.  
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Appendix 4 Descriptive Statistics: Price Model 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics; Price Model  
 
American Banks      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Price  375 51.1874 127.12 0 1002.21 
BEV-GW 326 59.3778 123.92 -1.516 997.361 
GW 265 3.08605 5.2513 0 36.1823 
Earn-GWimp 211 6.72878 16.939 -7.117 145.45 
GWimp 211 0.13577 0.5746 0 5.9155 
D*Earn 365 -0.05789 0.4973 -7.449 0 
D*BVE 326 -0.00421 0.0260 -1.3731 0 
      
European Banks      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Price  230 44.5 123.3 0.36 1065 
BEV-GW 190 66.28 204 0.62 1842 
GW 230 5.472 18.18 0 216.5 
Earn-GWimp 103 8.028 23.26 -25.62 277.3 
GWimp 103 0.1818 0.772 0 5.915 
D*Earn 230 -0.392 1.799 -25.9 0 
D*BVE 190 0 0 0 0 
      
American Pharma      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Price  343 17.553 19.687 0.179 112.8 
BEV-GW 313 3.8402 5.2638 -11.885 24.355 
GW 335 1.5243 5.6202 0 87.893 
Earn-GWimp 57 0.0101 1.2064 -3.549 3.325 
GWimp 57 0.1307 1.2064 0 3.444 
D*Earn 328 -0.5978 0.9786 -7.614 0 
D*BVE 313 -0.1588 0.6621 -4.690 0 
      
European Pharma      
Variable  N Mean  Std Dev Min  Max 
      
Price  303 30.637 67.888 0 599.78 
BEV-GW 279 19.785 73.574 -10.261 866 
GW 279 4.814 23.001 0 280.23 
Earn-GWimp 110 1.719 8.678 59.508 45.0364 
GWimp 110 0.1221 0.7399 0 7.5 
D*Earn 286 -0.5029 3.668 -59.508 0 
D*BVE 286 -1377 1.2321 -14.752 0 
      
 
Where Price is market value of equity for firm i in the end of year t and BVEit is the book value of equity for firm i in year t. 
GWit is the book value of goodwill for firm i in year t. Earnit is the net earnings for firm i in year t. GWimpit is the impairment 
of goodwill (if any) for firm i in year t.  
 
